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The impact of credit availability on consumption behavior is a central issue
in both theory and practice. The most stylized permanent income model
assumes that households can use a combination of saving (internal ﬁnance)
and borrowing (external ﬁnance) with consumption growth being governed
by the real interest rate, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the
discount factor. A standard caveat to this prediction comes from the pos-
sibility that some households may face unfavorable conditions for accessing
external ﬁnance – either because such ﬁnance is rationed or because the
terms of access are not attractive. Yet, even though the availability of exter-
nal ﬁnance plays a central role in theoretical thinking about consumption,
evidence for its empirical importance remains quite limited.
From a macro-economic point of view, access to credit may play an im-
portant role in the monetary transmission mechanism. The conventional
ﬁnancial accelerator model, as discussed in Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), tends to focus on how credit
conditions aﬀect the investment decisions of ﬁrms. The focus of this pa-
per is on credit and consumption decisions. With consumption accounting
for around two thirds of national income, such eﬀects may have important
macroeconomic ramiﬁcations. Moreover, recent global turbulence in ﬁnan-
cial markets has given such issues special poingnancy given that the terms
of access to ﬁnance for households has been changing.
This paper explores the empirical importance of external ﬁnance for
consumption in the U.K. using a novel measure of the terms available for
household external ﬁnance. The measure that we use is constructed from
mortgage data as the spread between the household speciﬁc interest rate
and the Bank of England’s policy rate paid by risky borrowers. We argue,
using a simple model, that this spread should reﬂect lenders’ perceptions of
default risk, i.e. the risk/liquidity premium relative to Libor that lenders
use to price mortgages, as well as competitive conditions in the mortgage
market.
Our two main contributions can be summarized as follows. First, we
construct of an aggregate index of households’ external cost of ﬁnance for
the U.K. over the period 1975-2005 using mortgage data. Second, we use
this measure to relate ﬁnancing conditions to consumption growth across
cohorts in the U.K.. An increase in households’ cost of external ﬁnancing,
due for instance to a larger wedge between borrowing and lending rates, will
tend to depress current consumption because borrowing is less attractive to
2households.1 We show that a negative correlation between a tightening in
credit conditions and consumption growth is predicted by a simple model of
consumption and secured lending.
Using data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), we ﬁnd a strong
empirical link between our Households’ External Financing (HEF)i n d e x
and consumption growth both at the aggregate level and when we disaggre-
gate the data by birth cohort, creating a pseudo panel. The latter exercise
reveals that the consumption of the relatively younger cohorts has been the
most responsive to our measure of access to external ﬁnance.
In Figure 1, the basic pattern that we uncover in the data is illus-
trated. In particular, we plot our HEF index against aggregate non-housing
consumption growth as measured in the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey.
Higher values of the HEF measure reﬂect a larger spread being charged to
risky borrowers. The ﬁgure suggests a strong, negative correlation between
the HEF index and consumption growth of −0.62. We will explore these
issues more carefully in what follows.
The next section reviews related theoretical and empirical literature. In
section 3, we present a simple model of the credit market and construct
our index of households’ external costs of ﬁnance from the SML dataset.
In section 4, we show how we use the HEF index to assess the impact of
access to external ﬁnance on household expenditure across cohorts. The
estimates of the consumption equation using aggregate (disaggregate) data
from the FES are reported in section 5 (section 6). The empirical results
are robust to alternative speciﬁcations, measures of consumption and level
of disaggregation. Section 7 concludes. A description of the data is detailed
in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we show an example in which the reduced-
form consumption equation we estimate on micro data can be derived from
ﬁrst principles.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to the large prior literature on the determinants of
consumption beginning from the classic work of Friedman (1957) and his
statement of the permanent income hypothesis. In a seminal paper, Hall
(1978) developed the implications of the model for aggregate consumption
using the Euler equation.
1One might expect the conditions associated with higher spreads also to be associated
with greater credit rationing, which also lowers current consumption compared to the past.
Thus the empirical implications for consumption on either interpretation are similar.
3The model has been developed in a variety of directions. For example,
Deaton (1991) introduced a precautionary savings motive for holding assets
and so expanded income to a cash in hand term, which covers consumer im-
patience, to model how consumption relates to income given precautionary
saving/liquidity constraints. Carroll (1997) also employs a buﬀer stocks
version of the permanent income hypothesis.
The implications of liquidity constraints for the framework were devel-
oped by Zeldes (1989) who emphasizes consumers would be expected to
have faster consumption growth between time t and t+1 as constraints kept
consumption at time t artiﬁcially low. Flemming (1973), King (1986), Lud-
vigson (1999) and Scott (2000) study further the impact of credit rationing
in unsecured lending on aggregate expenditure.
The link between liquidity constraints and consumption has been the
subject of a vast empirical literature which is too voluminous to summarised
in detail here.2 On macro data, Jappelli and Pagano (1989), Campbell and
Mankiw (1989), and Attanasio and Weber (1993) establish the excess sensi-
tivity of consumption to income, which they interpret as indirect evidence
for the existence of liquidity constraints.
On international data, Ludvigson (1999), and Bacchetta and Gerlach
(1997) provide evidence on the relationship between credit aggregates and
aggregate consumption. Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2007) show that
the interest rate elasticity of consumption depends on the structure of a
country’s mortgage market.
The most closely related contribution to this paper is the work by Aron
and Muellbauer (2007). They use an error correction model on aggre-
gate U.K. data from the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS) to investigate
whether the credit conditions index constructed in Fernandez-Corugedo and
Muellbauer (2006) aﬀects consumption.
This paper builds on Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer’s idea of using
data from mortgage lenders to construct a measure of credit conditions.
However, we use a rather diﬀerent procedure to construct an index, which
is designed to capture changes in the terms on which external ﬁnance is
available to households. A further contribution of our paper is to use
micro data on households’ expenditure aggregated at the birth cohort level
to test for heterogeneity in the eﬀects of external ﬁnancing conditions on
consumption.
The idea of using data on cohorts to study consumption was ﬁrst ex-
ploited in Attanasio and Weber (1994 and 1995), and used also in Banks,
2See Deaton (1992) and Browning and Lusardi (1996) for overviews.
4Blundell and Tanner (1998) and Banks, Blundell and Brugiavini (2001).
They report Euler equation estimates for the U.K. and the U.S. which are
inconsistent with the permanent income hypothesis.
Using micro data, Hall and Mishkin (1982), Zeldes (1989) and Johnson,
Parker and Souleles (2006) for the U.S., and Benito and Mumtaz (2008) for
the U.K. develop methods to infer the proportion of liquidity constrained
households from expenditure data. Their evidence, however, is indirect since
no data from credit market conditions are used in the estimation.
To the best of our knowledge, very few studies have provided direct evi-
dence on the link between consumption and liquidity constraints using micro
data. In two event studies, Gross and Souleles (2002), and Agarwal, Liu and
Souleles (2007) use credit card data to investigate the impact of credit card
limits and the 2001 tax rebates on households’ debt. Attanasio, Goldberg
and Kyriazidou (2007) use data on car loans to explore the relationship be-
tween loan conditions and loan demand. In the study most closely related
to our paper, Jappelli, Pischke and Souleles (1999) use the credit index in
Jappelli (1990) to estimate a regime-switching Euler equation model on food
expenditure. Furthermore, all these studies are for the U.S..
It is worth emphasizing that, unlike previous contributions on micro
data, we construct a ﬁnancing cost index for the whole economy by looking
at the lending conditions oﬀered to mortgagors.3 Furthermore, our index
is a time series describing the evolution of the household access to external
ﬁnance in the U.K. over the last thirty years. This compares to the credit
measure in Jappelli (1990) which is based on a single cross-section drawn
from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance.
3 Measuring the cost of external ﬁnance
The centerpiece of our analysis is a measure of the terms on which riskier
borrowers can access external ﬁnance. To motivate the exact measure that we
use, we present a simple theoretical model of the pricing of mortgage loans.
We then discuss how a regression of household borrowing rates on household
characteristics allows us to estimate an index of household external ﬁnance
access. We then discuss brieﬂy how this relates to our speciﬁcation of a
consumption equation.
3According to the 2007 NMG Research survey, mortgagors hold the vast majority of
both secured and unsecured debt in the U.K. (see Waldron and Young, 2007).
53.1 Theoretical background
To motivate our measure of the terms on which households gain access to
external ﬁnance, suppose that a mortgage can be viewed as a series of one
period debt contracts and priced relative to a lender’s (risk adjusted) op-
portunity cost of funds denoted by ρt. The assumption of a sequence of
one period debt arrangements is reasonable for the U.K. market where few
borrowers are locked into loan arrangements for signiﬁcant periods.
Consider a borrower whose probability of repayment is p(θit,z it) where
zit are variables that are observable to the lender, such as being a ﬁrst time
buyer, and θit are unobserved. Unobserved characteristics include how good
a worker the individual is and hence the likelihood that she will become
unemployed in the future. We suppose, for simplicity, that the latter is
as c a l a ra n dt h a t∂p/∂θit < 0 so that higher θit is associated with higher
default. The lender will be interested in the distribution of θit conditional on
zit which we denote by F (θ|zit,ψt),w h e r e∂F (θ|zit,ψt)/∂ψ < 0 it induces
a ﬁrst order stochastically dominating shift in the distribution of θ.F o r
ψt, we have in mind observable macro-factors that increase the likelihood of
unemployment on the sector in which the individual works. Let
¯ p(zit,ψt)=E {p(θit,z it):zit,ψt}
be the expected repayment probability conditional on observables. It is
easy to see that ∂¯ p(zit,ψt)/∂ψ < 0.
Suppose that the individual buys a unit of housing of which she borrows a
fraction αi. Thus an individual with lower αi has higher collateral. Then,
a competitively determined interest rate for borrower with characteristics
(zit) is:
¯ p(zit,ψt)αi (1+r(zit,ψt))+(1-¯ p(zit,ψt))min{[E (v) − k],αi [1+r(zit,ψt)]}=αi (1+ρt)
where the expectation is taken with respect to v, the value of a unit of
housing which is uncertain and distributed on [v, ¯ v] with density g(v), and
k is the foreclosure cost. Solving for the equilibrium interest rate shows
that this will vary for two kinds of borrowers depending on their housing
collateral. If v − k ≥ αi [1 + ρt] then
r(zit,ψt)=ρt.
These individuals are low risk borrowers whose housing collateral is suﬃcient
to repay their loan and cover foreclosure costs in all states of the world. Their
loan rate moves with the risk adjusted opportunity cost of funds. Thus, we
6would expect their borrowing rates to vary with changes in the degree of
competition in the mortgage market and/or factors that change either risk
or liquidity premia in the market for loanable funds.
If v − k<α i [1 + ρt], then:
r(zit,ψt) ' ρt +
½
g (v)[1− ¯ p(zit,ψt)]
1 − g(v)[1− ¯ p(zit,ψt)]
¾
[αi (1 + ρt) − v + k]
where the second term on the right hand side includes an additional premium
for riskier borrowers. This can be thought of as the households’ counterpart
of the ﬁrms’ external ﬁnance premium in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999).
The household risk premium will change with the ψt factors that aﬀect
the subjective risk assessment and with expected house prices. In a world
where vit is increasing and/or ψt is decreasing, then interest rate premia









t is Bank Rate and ρ1
t is an unobserved risk/liquidity premium and δt
is a mark-up reﬂecting competition in the credit market. Then the spread
between the borrowing rate faced by each household and the Bank rate,
r(zit,ψt) − ρ0



















A similar approach has been followed by to Jeske and Krueger (2005) to
study the welfare implications of implicit government guarantees on aggre-
gate credit risks.
This model motivates why low collateral borrowers (higher αi)w i l lp a y
a higher risk premium. We also expect borrowers with riskier observable
characteristics zit, such as being a ﬁrst buyer, to pay a higher risk premium.
Suppose that we can observe in the data zit and ρ0
t, then the expressions
in (1) show that we should be able to extract information about changes over
time in δt and ρ1
t from all borrowers. However, for the riskiest borrowers we
can extract information about the house price expectations and subjective
estimate of ψt by looking at the spreads they paid. This is the empirical
procedure that we follow.4
4In fact, αt and ρ
1
t aﬀect the classiﬁcation of a borrower as risky in our terms, and
73.2 Empirical implementation
In this section, we present the construction of our index of households’ ex-
ternal ﬁnancing costs based upon the SML dataset, whose full description is
g i v e ni nA p p e n d i xA .A na v e r a g eo f40,000 randomly selected borrowers was
surveyed each year over the period 1975-2005. The number of interviewees
ranges from 35,000 in 1975 to 115,000 in 2005.
Our goal is to create a measure which captures the terms on which riskier
households can gain access to credit. To this end, we use information on
housing tenure status and collateral values to identify the borrowers who may
be viewed as ‘risky’ by the lenders. More speciﬁcally, we focus on First Time
Buyers (FTB) who have been able to pay down only a small initial deposit.
To make individual collateral values comparable across time, we normalize
them using regional house prices. A preliminary exploration of the data
reveals that the relationship between individual interest rate spreads and
the logarithm of real collateral has a kink around the value of 2 for real
collateral. Accordingly, we classify all borrowers with a real initial deposit
below this value belonging to the low collateral group.5
For each year in our panel, we run a regression for the interest rate
spread, xi,t, paid by each borrower in the low collateral group on individual
characteristics and macroeconomic conditions.6 The spread is measured
as the diﬀerence between the rate individuals are charged on new mortgage
lending and the 3 month Treasury Bill rate in the month that the lending
occurred. The regression takes the following form:
xi,t = μr,t + μFTB,t+ γzi,t + ϕ∆qr,t + εi,t (2)
where μr,t is a vector of (Standard Statistical) region dummy variables in
year t, μFTB,t is a dummy variable indicating if the individual is a ﬁrst-time
buyer, zi includes income, yi, age, loan size, the value of the house, vi,t h e
value of collateral, age interacted with loan value for the individual i,a n d
∆qr,t is regional real house price inﬂation. All variables except interest rates
are in logarithm.
the dependence of the spread on these variables is diﬀerent for riskier borrowers. This is
consistent with the observation on U.K. data that the spread of mortgage rates over the
Bank rate varies with the collateral position of each household (see Aoki, Proudman and
Vlieghe 2004).
5As we transform the data by taking logarithms, borrowers in the zero collateral group,
who represent on average 4.8% of the entire population, are excluded from our estimation.
The cut oﬀ point of 2 corresponds to about 3% of the value for the average house price in
2005.
6Controlling for individual characteristics is also important to minimize the impact of
compositional changes in the FTB population on the construction of our index.
8As we argued above, there are good reasons to believe that borrowers in
observably higher risk groups would be charged at a higher rate, conditional
upon the observable characteristics zi,t.T h e c o e ﬃcient on the FTB dummy,
μFTB,t, in equation (2) for the low collateral group is meant to capture the






in equation (1) averaged across
the FTB group at date t. Since in this group the average value of αi (the
ﬂip-side of low collateral) is relatively high, we expect this group (and the
interest rate that they are charged) to be particularly sensitive to changes
in ψt aﬀecting perceptions of default risk over time. The time variation in
this coeﬃcient is thus a proxy for variation in ψt aﬀecting credit conditions
across the market. Our Household External Finance (HEF) index is then
constructed by combining into a time series the estimated coeﬃcients on
μFTB,t for each year t.
As the SML dataset only cover individuals who eventually accessed a
credit line, it is important to assess the extent to which selection might bias
our estimates. To investigate this issue, we rely on information about the
stamp duties paid by each home buyer at the time of the purchase. Stamp
duties are likely to inﬂuence the housing tenure decision without aﬀecting
the borrowing rate mortgagors are charged, and therefore they can be used
as independent variable in the selection equation of a Heckman model which
includes also all other explanatory variables in (2). Based on the estimates of
the selection equation, we compute the inverse Mills’ ratio for being a First
Time Buyer, which we then use in an augmented version of regression (2).
We ﬁnd that the inverse Mills’ ratio is statistically diﬀerent from zero only
in 1990, 1992 and 2000. Furthermore, the correlation between our original
HEF index and the index based on the Heckman procedure is 0.99.W e
conclude that selection is of little signiﬁcance in our data and therefore, in
what follows, we will use the credit index based on (2).
In Figure 2, we plot the HEF index against annual FES consumption
growth for six birth-cohorts. High values of the HEF index represent an
increase in the households’ cost of external ﬁnancing. We note that the con-
temporaneous correlations between cohort consumption and the HEF index
is always negative with a peak for the households in the cohorts covering
1966-70.7 As our panel is stratiﬁed by the level of real collateral as opposed
to birth groups, the HEF index does not vary across birth cohorts.
In Figure 3, we show the width of the 95% conﬁdence interval for the HEF
7In particular, the correlations are: -0.20 (1941-45), -0.58 (46-50), -0.47 (51-55), -0.22
(56-60), -0.07 (61-65), -0.66 (66-70).
9measure: variation in pricing responses to ﬁrst time buyers’ deals within the
low collateral group has signiﬁcantly declined over time. It is worth em-
phasizing that the time proﬁles of both the HEF index in Figure 1 and the
standard errors associated with its point estimates in Figure 3 are consistent
with the signiﬁcant waves of ﬁnancial liberalization of the 1980s, namely the
entry of commercial banks into the mortgage market (previously played only
by building societies) and the introduction of securitization products. Since
the mid-90s, the volatility of both series has declined.
4 Consumption growth and external ﬁnance
This section discusses how we use the HEF index to study consumption and
how this links back to underlying theories of consumption behavior based
on the life-cycle permanent income model.
We expect the measure of external ﬁnancial conditions that we have
extracted from mortgage data to be reﬂecting how credit markets are pricing
risk to riskier classes of borrowers. The theoretical relevance of this to
estimating consumption is not immediately clear but can be motivated using
the classical Euler equation for inter-temporal consumption employed in
most modern empirical work on consumption.
4.1 Empirical implementation
Suppose that each household has a utility function which depends on their
consumption, Cit, and household-speciﬁc characteristics, γit.I n t h e m o s t
basic version of the model, consumers are price takers and optimize given a
process for their income, Yit, and other relevant stochastic variables. They
also have access to credit markets to smooth their consumption over the
life-cycle. This leads to the standard Euler condition, which can be log-
linearized and augmented with an excess sensitivity term on income to yield
the type of equations that have typically been estimated on macro and micro
data.
In theory, augmenting the model to incorporate liquidity constraints
is accomplished by specifying an additional constraint on the consumers’
optimization problem. This constraint reﬂects access to credit which binds
for a given consumer in some time periods. Deﬁne χit as the extra utility
stemming from relaxing the liquidity constraint at time t,t h e ni tm a k e s
most sense to think of our HEFt measure as reﬂecting the aggregate factors
which make it more or less likely that χit is positive, i.e. individuals are
borrowing constrained. Zeldes (1989) develops the implications of borrowing
10constraint on unsecured lending for aggregate consumption. In Appendix
B, we generalize Zeldes’ model to the case in which the household debt is
collateralized to the stock of housing wealth.
An alternative interpretation of our interest rate spread measure is to
suppose that there is a wedge between the borrowing and savings rates
faced by households. The spread measure tells us something about the
borrowing rates paid by riskier borrowers. This supposes that households
can use ﬂexible mortgage borrowing arrangements to manage their inter-
temporal consumption decision rather than the Treasury Bill rate, which
is more likely to be relevant for saving. Obviously, this ignores the fact
that unsecured credit (particularly credit card borrowing) is also used for
consumption smoothing. To extent that the factors driving risk premia
in mortgage lending are correlated with the determinants of risk premia
in the credit market as a whole, however, we would expect HEF also to
measure some aspects of access to all credit. In future work, it would be
interesting to look at extracting information on spreads in unsecured credit
to supplement the information extracted from mortgage contracts.
In light of the considerations above, we will aggregate micro data to
estimate the following reduced-form consumption growth equation at the
aggregate level:
∆ct = θ0 + θ1rt + θ2∆yt + θ3HEFt + θ4∆qt + θ5∆γt + ηt (3)
where rt is a risk-free rate and ∆yt is real income growth, as suggested
by the empirical literature on excess sensitivity. Appendix B develops a
foundation for (3) using a simple model of secured lending and heterogeneous
consumers.
Including the change in house prices in (3) can be given a number of
possible interpretations. Several authors including Campbell and Cocco
(2007), Attanasio et al. (2005) and Benito et al. (2006) have explored the
empirical correlation between real house price inﬂation and consumption
growth in the U.K.. House price changes could be thought of as a proxy for
changes in permanent income or appear because housing is used as collateral,
as in the approach suggested in Appendix B. Housing may also be viewed
as net wealth. Our reduced form approach will not be able to distinguish
between these competing interpretations.
The real interest rate as well as the HEF index enter equation (3) con-
temporaneously. The reason behind this choice is threefold. First, the vast
majority of mortgage contracts in the UK (and thus in our sample) are based
on variable rates and monthly repayments. This implies that whenever com-
mercial institutions change their lending rates, typically around the Bank
11of England interest rate setting decision at the beginning of each month,
the borrowers’ monthly repayment is aﬀected within that month. Second,
the variables in (3), including the interest rates, are averaged (in levels)
over a period of one year. Third, we wish to compare our ﬁndings with the
estimates on FES data from earlier contributions, which have adopted this
time convention.8 Note, however, that in the IV estimation, we will also
confront the possibility that past values of the interest rate are used to form
expectations of contemporaneous and future values.
The vector γt includes age, age squared, family size and family size
squared. As measurement errors in diﬀerentiated data and time aggrega-
tion may introduce MA components in the error term, standard errors are
adjusted for serial correlation up to order three as well as heteroskedasticity.
We are particularly interested in whether θ3 has any explanatory power
in such an equation. If HEFt is picking up the extent of credit access for
households, we would expect it to enter (3) with a negative sign reﬂecting
t h ef a c tt h a t( t h ep r e s e n c eo rt h ea n t i c i pation of) more cautious lending, as
implied by a higher spread, reduces current consumption.
The FES covers a randomly selected sample of around 7000 British
households per year. The full dataset consists of a time-series of repeated
cross-sections, and therefore the method introduced by Deaton (1985) can be
used to create a pseudo-panel. For each variable and year, we take geometric
means and compute: (i) a single time-series on average data, including most
households in the survey; (ii) six time-series on average cohort data, includ-
ing only the participant households whose head was born in the intervals
1941-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, 66-70.9
At this disaggregated level, the core equation to be estimated is:
∆cc,t = κc + κ1rt + κ2∆yc,t + κ3HEFt + κ4∆qt + κ5∆γc,t + ηct (4)
where a subscript c refers to a birth cohort and where κc is a vector of
birth cohort dummies. To look for heterogeneity in the impact of the HEF
measure we will augment (4) with a set of interaction terms between HEFt
and birth cohort. This will allows us to see how far diﬀerent cohorts have
responded to changes in the terms on which external ﬁnance is available.
8See for instance Attanasio and Weber (1993), Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1998),
Banks, Blundell and Brugiavini (2001), and Campbell and Cocco (2007) among others.
9We consider only cells with at least 120 observations per year. The birth bands were
chosen so as to maximize the number of time-series observations available for each cohort.
125 Evidence from aggregate FES data
In this section, we present aggregate results based on the merge between
synthetic annual data on households’ external ﬁnancing costs from the SML
and synthetic annual data on household expenditure from the FES. The
description of the data sets is provided in Appendix A.
5.1 Main results
Our baseline measure of consumption is non-housing expenditure and ser-
vices. The explanatory variables include the 3 month Treasury bill rate, de-
mographic variables, disposable income, national house prices and the HEF
index whose construction we discussed in the previous section. We deﬂate
the relevant variables using the Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage in-
terest payments (RPIX), normalize consumption and income by family size,
a n dt h e nt a k eﬁrst diﬀerences of all variables except the interest rate and
our credit index. To make the coeﬃcients on rt and HEFt comparable in
magnitude, we standardize the credit index and scale it up by the standard
deviation of the Treasury Bill. The sample covers the years between 1975
and 2005.
Our goal is to investigate the link between consumption and HEF in
the aggregate. For each year, we therefore compute the average value of
expenditures across most participating households in the FES.10
In Table 1, we report the OLS results. In the ﬁrst column, we show
the estimates of a baseline speciﬁcation in which consumption displays the
usual “excess sensitivity” to income. For the sake of comparability with the
previous literature, note that the results reported here are not statistically
diﬀerent from those reported in Attanasio and Weber (1993). In the second
column, we add our measure of households’ external cost of ﬁnancing, which
is found to have a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient.
To give an order of magnitude for the aggregate eﬀe c tp r e d i c t e db yt h e
estimates in Table 1, we note that a one standard deviation increase in
the HEF index is associated with a fall in annual consumption growth a
little below 1%. This is the same as saying a 100 b a s i sp o i n t si n c r e a s ei n
the wedge between borrowing and lending rates is associated with a fall in
annual consumption growth a touch below 0.29%.
10For consistency with the cohort analysis below, we report aggregate estimates based
on (i) all households whose head is born between 1940 and 1970, and (ii) cells with a
minimum of 120 observations.
13The inclusion of house price inﬂa t i o ni nt h es p e c i ﬁcation in the third
column improves the ﬁtf u r t h e r . 11 The estimated coeﬃcient on ∆qt is sig-
niﬁcant but smaller than the value found by Campbell and Cocco (2007)
whose analysis is based on quarterly data and a shorter sample. The re-
sults imply that a 1% change in house prices is associated with a 0.17%
change in consumption growth.
The most general speciﬁcation in the last column is associated with a
R2 of 0.71.T h ec o e ﬃcient on the real interest rate is robust across models
but the coeﬃcient on income growth becomes only marginally signiﬁcant at
the 10% level after controlling for house price growth and credit conditions.
Consumption growth is a positive function of age, though at a decreasing
r a t e ,a n dt h er a t eo fh o u s ep r i c ei n ﬂation remains signiﬁcant. The HEF
index conﬁr m si t s e l fa sas i g n i ﬁcant driver of consumption.
The inference based on OLS relies implicitly on three key assumptions.
First, current values of the real interest rate, real income growth and real
consumption growth are good proxies for their expected values. Second,
measurement errors are averaged out by aggregating over households. Third,
the explanatory variables, including inﬂation expectations and the nominal
interest rates, are exogenous to consumption growth.
One way to assess the extent to which these assumptions aﬀect our ﬁnd-
ings is to estimate the consumption function using instrumental variables,
with lagged values of consumption growth, income growth, inﬂation and the
nominal interest rate as instruments for their current values. In selecting
the lag lengths of the instruments, it is important to bear in mind two is-
sues which may introduce an MA(1) component in the error term. First,
the data are at an annual frequency and hence are time averaged.12 Second,
the disturbance embodies an expectation error. The ﬁrst order serial corre-
lation in the error term implies that the ﬁrst lag of the instruments would
lead to inconsistent estimates, as argued by Bean (1986). We therefore use
the second and third lags of consumption, income, inﬂation and the nominal
interest rate as additional instruments. We also add the lag of house price
inﬂation and the HEF index to the instrument list in an eﬀort to capture
expectations of future house prices and credit conditions.13
11As argued in the previous section, this could either be interpreted as a wealth eﬀect
working through imperfections in the credit market, a collateral eﬀect or as a proxy for
permanent income.
12When the households’ decision period is shorter than the data sampling interval, Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Marshall (1991) show that the time-average of multiple decisions
i n t r o d u c e sas p u r i o sﬁrst order serial correlation in consumption growth.
13The use of the ﬁrst lag of HEF as instrument also accounts for the fact that the HEF
14In Table 2, we report the estimates of the aggregate consumption equa-
tion obtained with the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) using an
optimal weighting matrix that accounts for the possibility of heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation in the error terms (see Hansen, 1982), namely a
three lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance matrix.
The GMM estimates conﬁrm, by and large, the results based on the
O L S .T h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on the HEF index is always signiﬁcant, while
income growth loses its explanatory power in the most general speciﬁcations
on the right of Table 2. Age has a nonlinear eﬀect on consumption and
house price inﬂation has a small but signiﬁcant positive correlation with
consumption growth.
The fact that the evidence on excess sensitivity is signiﬁcantly weaker
when controlling for house prices and credit conditions in both the OLS
and GMM speciﬁcations makes economic sense if house prices are proxying
for permanent income changes and excess sensitivity is a reﬂection of credit
conditions.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
As a way to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings, we estimate the con-
sumption equation using the aggregate data released by the ONS, and the
aggregate data on non-durables expenditure constructed from the FES.
ONS consumption data
An alternative way to account for the measurement errors in the mi-
cro data is to employ contemporaneous values of (seasonally adjusted) con-
sumption growth and income growth from the Oﬃce for National Statistics
(ONS) as instruments for their FES counterparts, while keeping the second
and third lags of inﬂation and the Treasury Bill rate as instruments for the
real interest rate.
These results are reported in Table 3, and they are a useful check for the
sensitivity of our results to using a smaller instrument set. The estimates in
the ﬁrst four columns are not statistically diﬀerent from the values reported
in Table 2, and thus they conﬁrm the empirical relevance of the household
terms of access to the credit market for consumption growth.
Earlier contributions have found little support for the real interest rate
term in a consumption growth equation estimated using aggregate data from
national statistics as regressand (see for instance Campbell and Mankiw,
1990). In Table 4, we use ONS non-housing consumption as the dependent
index is a generated regressor (see Pagan, 1984, and Pagan and Ullah, 1988).
15variable. The estimates for the baseline speciﬁcation in column 1 conﬁrms
Campbell and Mankiw’s ﬁndings on excess sensitivity. When we include our
HEF measure in column 2, however, income growth loses signiﬁcance, and
adding house price inﬂation in the last two columns makes the coeﬃcient
on the real interest rate statistically diﬀerent from zero. These results are
therefore supportive of the ﬁndings from the FES data.
Non-durable consumption
In Table 5, we use non-durable consumption and services rather than
non-housing expenditure and services as the dependent variable. The results
conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings that the coeﬃcient on our HEF measure is
negative, large, and signiﬁcant, while income growth loses its explanatory
power in the most general of speciﬁcations.
6 Evidence from disaggregated data
The evidence on aggregate FES data corroborates the idea that the cost of
external ﬁnancing is signiﬁcantly correlated with consumption growth. In
this section, we assess the extent to which the aggregate results are robust
to splitting the FES sample according to birth cohorts. In so doing, we
will also be able to explore the importance of heterogeneity in responses to
changing household ﬁnancing conditions across birth cohorts.
6.1 Main results by birth cohort
The results in Table 6 present evidence using OLS while including a cohort
ﬁxed eﬀect and a separate linear time trend for each birth cohort. Standard
errors are adjusted for intra-group correlation.
The coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst column are similar to those obtained in At-
tanasio and Weber (1993). Using a shorter time period, Banks, Blundell
and Tanner (1998), and Banks, Blundell and Brugiavini (2001) also obtain
estimates of the consumption sensitivity to the real interest rate which are
not statistically diﬀerent from ours.
T h ei m p a c to ft h ee x t e r n a lﬁnancing cost on consumption is negative,
large and signiﬁcant in columns 2 and 4. When we interact the HEF index
with birth cohort speciﬁc dummy variables in column 5, we ﬁnd evidence
in favor of heterogeneity. In particular, the eﬀect of our HEF measure on
the consumption growth of the oldest cohort is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, while the eﬀect is signiﬁcant for all other cohorts. The youngest cohort,
with a household head born between 1966 and 1970, is associated with the
16“peak eﬀect” of the HEF index, which is signiﬁcantly larger than for any
other cohort.
The real interest rate and income growth both have explanatory power,
with point estimates robust across speciﬁcations. House price inﬂation is
also signiﬁcant at a 5% level.
As for the GMM, we report results based on the two instrument sets dis-
cussed above. For all estimates, the null hypothesis of weak instruments is
rejected on the basis of the Anderson’s canonical correlation statistics while
the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions is not rejected on the
basis of the Hansen’s J statistics.14 All speciﬁcations include a dummy and
a linear time trend for each birth cohort. Standard errors are computed
using a three lag Newey-West adjustment.
Our ﬁnding of heterogeneous responses to the HEF index is robust to
using GMM, as shown in Table 7. The standard errors are larger than in
the OLS case, possibly reﬂecting the fact that the numbers of cohorts and
instruments imply there are insuﬃcient degrees of freedom to use an optimal
weighting matrix which is robust to intra-cluster correlation.
The point estimates of the coeﬃcient on the real interest rate is sys-
tematically higher than in Table 6, suggesting that the OLS results may
suﬀer from measurement errors and endogeneity. In contrast to the OLS
estimates, the parameter on income growth in Table 7 is not statistically
diﬀerent from zero when real house price inﬂation is included in column 3,
a n di nt h em o r eg e n e r a ls p e c i ﬁcations reported in columns 4 and 5.
Interpreting the results
The attenuation and loss of signiﬁcance of the income growth coeﬃcient
in columns 3, 4 and 5 of Table 7 is consistent with the idea that income
growth, in the baseline model of column 1, may be capturing income expec-
tations as well as the existence (or the expectation) of unfavourable terms on
which external ﬁnance can be accessed by households. We now use this idea
to see whether the kind of eﬀect that is coming through the HEF is similar
in magnitude to the cohort speciﬁc excess sensitivity to income growth.
The HEF index is based on the premia paid in the mortgage market by
ﬁrst time buyers in the low collateral group. While this class of borrowers
typically does not count for more than 8% of the mortgage deals in a given
year, it may allow us to identify a measure of access to credit for a far wider
group of households facing similar borrowing conditions. In terms of the
model in section 3.1, this would be true to the extent that our measure
14The results of the tests are not reported but available from the authors upon request.
17is partly picking up factors that are included in ψt which reﬂects common
underlying factors (such as the risk of unemployment in particular groups)
that have implications for a wider class of borrowers.
Earlier studies of the eﬀect of credit constraints, such as Zeldes (1989)
have proceeded by classifying consumers into constrained and unconstrained
on a priori basis rather than having a direct measure of credit market condi-
tions. If our HEF measure is indeed a good proxy for the credit conditions
aﬀecting a wider group, it seems reasonable that these will have a greater
impact on the younger consumers within a cohort. Indeed, since most ﬁrst
time buyers are young and have little opportunity to acquire collateral, this
is what our HEF measure reﬂects. This line of reasoning suggests that, for
the groups that are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by credit conditions, the impact of
the HEF index should be similar in magnitude to the extent of consumption
excess sensitivity to income.
We investigate this issue by running a regression in the spirit of Camp-
bell and Mankiw (1989). In particular, we estimate on the micro data a
standard consumption growth equation, without the HEF index, but aug-
mented with slope heterogeneity in the excess sensitivity to income growth
across birth cohorts. To the extent that our measure captures aggregate
credit conditions, we would expect the change in consumption growth im-
plied by a one standard deviation movement in income growth to be of a
similar magnitude of the change in consumption growth implied by a one
standard deviation movement in credit conditions.
The estimates of this exercise are reported in column 6 of Table 7 and
they suggest two conclusions. First, in line with the results on the HEF
measure, the consumption of the youngest cohort is the most sensitive to
ﬂuctuations in income growth. The coeﬃcients on ∆yt for the oldest co-
horts, in contrast, are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Second, a one
standard deviation fall in income growth for the youngest group implies a
decline in aggregate consumption growth of 1.1%, based on their share of
expenditure in 2005. This number is remarkably similar to the 1% obtained
using HEF.
While not conclusive, this evidence does suggest that in quantitative
terms, at least, the size of our estimated eﬀect is consistent with the HEF
index picking up a wider measure of access to credit among the young. Since
mortgage credit to inexperienced borrowers with no collateral is the closest
(among secured credit) to unsecured credit, it seems a reasonable conjecture
that this could well be a proxy for unsecured credit conditions. It will be
interesting to investigate this hypothesis in future research.
186.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of our cohort level results to three
changes in our estimation strategy. First, we use ONS consumption data as
instruments. Second, we consider a further level of disaggregation by age.
Third, we employ non-durables expenditure as the dependent variable. The
ﬁnding that the consumption of young households is more inﬂuenced by
credit conditions relative to the consumption of older households is shown
to be robust to each of these modiﬁcations.15
ONS consumption data
In Table 8, we note that using a smaller instrument set produces esti-
mates very similar to those in Table 7. The coeﬃcient on the HEF index
is highly signiﬁcant in the more aggregate speciﬁcations in columns 2 and
4, and is signiﬁcant only for a younger cohort reported in the heterogenous
cohort speciﬁcation in column 5.
Age and birth cohorts
In interpreting the results above, we rely on the notion that the birth
cohorts provide a reasonable approximation for the age cohorts. The cohort
in which the head of household is born between 1940 and 1945, for instance,
can be thought as the oldest consumers in our sample while the cohort in
which the head of household is born between 1965 and 1970 can be thought
as the youngest consumers.
We can further divide our sample by using information about age. The
idea is that the consumption of a family whose head was born in 1942
and interviewed in, say, 1975 may be diﬀerent from the consumption of a
family whose head was born in 1942 but was interviewed in 2005. Data
availability, however, limit the level of disaggregation. The FES is based
on 7000 household interviews per year, and with the birth cohorts spanning
the 1950s or the 1960s our constraint of 120 observations per cell becomes
binding quickly when splitting cells further by age.
In an eﬀort to maximize the number of households per cell and the
number of time-series observations per cohort, we label as ‘young’ (‘old’)
15In further sensitivity analyses, not reported but available upon request, we also ﬁnd
that: (i) adding ∆cc,t−1 as explanatory variable, (ii) using the time deposit rate rather
than the 3 month Treasury bill rate, and (iii) deﬂating all variables with a divisia price
index rather than RPIX do not aﬀect our main conclusions on the importance of access
to external ﬁnance in aﬀecting consumption growth. For each household, the divisia price
index is constructed as the average of the price indices of the categories of goods and
services in the reported expenditure, weighted by the household-budget shares.
19the households whose head is aged below or equal to (above) 35 at the time
of the FES interview. This age threshold allows us to split the cohorts
born between 1951 and 1960. However, for the cohorts born between 1940
and 1950, there are insuﬃcient observations to generate a large enough sub-
group of ‘young consumers’. And similarly, for the cohorts born between
1961 and 1970, there are insuﬃcient observations to generate a sub-group of
‘old consumers’. Hence, for these cohorts, we do not attempt any further
disaggregation.
The results on the age and birth cohorts are reported in Table 9 and
conﬁrm the signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the eﬀect of households’ external
cost of ﬁnancing across groups. The consumption growth of the cohort
whose head is born between 1941 and 1945 is not correlated with the HEF
index. Moving to the two birth cohorts between 1951 and 1960, we ﬁnd
that the impact of our measure of access to external ﬁnance is signiﬁcant
for the consumption growth of the young households, but is not statistically
diﬀerent from zero for the older households in the same birth cohort.
The coeﬃcients on the HEF index in the birth cohorts 1961 to 1965
and 1966 to 1970 are also negative and signiﬁcant, as we may expect given
that these groups are dominated by the young throughout our sample. The
youngest birth cohort is also associated with a negative impact of ﬁnancing
costs which is signiﬁcantly larger than the impacts on older cohorts. In
summary, we ﬁnd further evidence in support of the notion that the young
are more exposed to changes in the terms on which they access the credit
market than the old.
Non-durable consumption
Finally, we investigate the robustness of our results to using non-durable
consumption and services growth rather than non-housing expenditure and
services growth as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table
10. The signiﬁcance and heterogeneity of the HEF index across cohorts is
largely unaﬀected by the change in the left-hand side variable, although
the interaction between HEF and the 1956 to 1960 birth cohort does lose
signiﬁcance.
According to our estimates, the youngest cohort is the group of house-
holds whose consumption is most exposed to changes in the terms of access
to ﬁnance. In columns 4 and 5, the coeﬃcients on house price inﬂation are
signiﬁcant but smaller in magnitude than when non-housing expenditure
and services were used as the dependent variable in Table 6.
207C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has investigated the link between consumption growth and the
terms of access to external ﬁnance by households measured from the interest
rate spread on mortgage ﬁnance for the riskiest group of borrowers. We
have shown that the HEF index that we construct from mortgage data is
robustly correlated with consumption growth between 1975 and 2005, with
stronger eﬀects in younger birth cohorts. These ﬁndings are robust to a
wide variety of empirical speciﬁcations.
Taken together, the results support the claim that the terms on which
households can access to external ﬁnance to smooth their consumption mat-
ter for consumption growth. The improved terms on which households
can access credit can, according to our measure, account for a signiﬁcant
amount of the growth in consumption over the period of our study. An
increase of 100 basis points in the wedge between borrowing and lending
rates is associated, on average, with a fall in aggregate annual consump-
tion growth of about 0.3%. As in the past thirty years or so non-negative
individual interest rate spreads in the UK have averaged around 160 basis
points, with peaks above 1000 basis points, the impact of credit conditions
on consumption growth is certainly of economic signiﬁcance.
In a broader macro-economic context, our results complement existing
work on the ﬁnancial accelerator through changing access to credit for busi-
nesses as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The literature to date
has emphasized the link to business investment from changing credit con-
ditions. The results reported here suggest that there is scope for a quan-
titatively signiﬁcant direct channel from credit conditions onto household
behavior through the way in which risk is priced in the markets for secured
household debt.
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25Appendix A
This appendix provides further details on the SML and FES data sets used
for the estimation in the main text.
Survey of Mortgage Lenders
In order to construct our HEF index measure, we use mortgage origi-
nation data covering the period 1975 to 2005 from the Survey of Mortgage
Lenders (SML) and its predecessor, the 5% Sample Survey of Building So-
ciety Mortgages (SBSM). These surveys are available in electronic format
for the years 1975 to 2001 from the Data Archive at the University of Es-
sex. Unfortunately, the year 1978 is missing, and so we have interpolated
the 1978 data where relevant. Data covering the period 2002 to 2005 was
obtained by the Bank of England from the Council of Mortgage Lenders
(CML).
The switch between the SBSM and SML surveys reﬂected the changing
nature of the mortgage market in the U.K.. Increased competition from
Banks and other specialist lenders combined with the demutualisation of the
Abbey National resulted in the creation of the CML in 1989, and eventual
extension of the SBSM to accommodate all members of the CML in 1992. In
2003 the SML sample size was expanded, with most contributors providing
a full sample of mortgage completions rather than a 5% random sample.
The surveys provide a range of information including data covering char-
acteristics of the loan at origination (the loan size, purchase price, gross
rate of interest, whether the interest charged is ﬁxed or variable, repayment
method, etc.) and individual borrower characteristics (sex and age of bor-
rowers, income on which the mortgage is based, previous tenure, region etc).
The surveys form a repeated cross-section and the method in Deaton (1985)
can be used to construct a pseudo-panel.
To obtain estimates for our measure of the HEF index we supplement
data from the SBSM/SML on loan size, property value, gross interest rate,
age and income, with regional house price data from the Nationwide house
price index. We also place the following restrictions upon the data and:
1. discard individuals over the age of 75 and under 21.
2. omit individuals buying a house with a price discount and who were
previously local authority or housing association tenants.
3. exclude sitting tenants not-covered by restriction 2.
264. discard observations where lending is not for house purchase (further
advances and remortgaging activity).
5. omit observations for individuals with outlying loan-to-income (LTI)
and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. The threshold levels chosen were
LTI>=10, and LTV<0.2 or LTV>1.1.
6. discard observations with a gross interest rate below 0.5% per annum,
or where the absolute value of the spread between the gross rate of
interest and the 3 month Treasury Bill rate is greater than 10% of the
Treasury Bill rate.
7. omit observations where relevant data are missing.
In Table 11, we provide descriptive statistics of the SML data we use.
Family Expenditure Survey
We use data on household consumption, disposable income, demograph-
ics and housing status from the Family Expenditure Survey available on-
line at http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/ﬁndingdata/festitles.asp. The sam-
ple spans the period 1975-2005, with the ﬁrst observation associated with
the beginning of our SML data set and the last observation marking the
latest available data in July 2007 when the data were collected.
Our baseline measure of consumption is non-housing expenditure and
services, deﬁned as total expenditure minus expenditure for housing plus
‘repair’ and ‘do it yourself’ (diy). Non-durable consumption is the sum
of two week reported expenditure on food, catering, alcohol, tobacco, fuel,
household services, clothing, personal goods and services, fares, leisure ser-
vices, consumables, pet care, repair, diy, motoring expenditure, recreational
goods.
Nominal variables are deﬂated using the Retail Prices Index minus mort-
gage interest payments (RPIX). Consumption and income are divided by the
size of the household, fsize.T h ev a r i a b l eage refers to the age of the head
of household, deﬁned on the basis of income. The variable owner stands for
the proportion of homeowners in each cohort.
To ensure the FES data are representative of the UK population, we plot
in Figure 4 the aggregate per-capita non-housing real consumption growth
from the FES and the corresponding ONS series. For the sake of compa-
rability with the ONS data, in Figure 4, and only in Figure 4, the FES
consumption growth is computed as the log diﬀerence of the average of all
households in the FES panel, i.e. arithmetic mean.
In Tables 12 and 13, we report descriptive statistics for our FES dataset.
27Appendix B
In this appendix, we show that an empirical consumption equation such as
(3) can be derived as the reduced-form of the solution to a simple modi-
ﬁcation of a standard optimization problem in which individuals can bor-
row against their stock of housing wealth. The model in this section is in
the spirit of Iacoviello (2005), and it generalizes the contribution by Zeldes
(1989) to the case of secured lending.
Consider an inﬁnite horizon economy where each household i chooses
its plan for consumption, Ci,t,h o u s i n gHi,t and assets, Bi,t, that maximizes





,w h e r eγi,t are household-speciﬁc characteristics. The op-
timal plans are derived subject to the following constraints:
Ci,t + Qt (Hi,t − Hi,t−1) ≤ Yi,t + Bi,t−1 (1 + rt) − Bi,t ∀ t=1..T (5)
Bi,t ≥− ¯ αiE (Qt+1)Hi,t ∀ t=1..T-1 (6)
lim
k→∞
Bi,t+k ≥ 0 (7)
where Qt is the real price of a unit of housing, real income is denoted by Yi,t,
the real interest rate is rt, the expectations operator is E (·) and ¯ αi represents
the multiplier on the expected value of a unit of housing which establishes the
maximum amount of secured lending that each household i can undertake at
time t. Note that in the UK mortgage market the multiplier ¯ αi is determined
in terms of the loan rather than the repayment. The expression in (5) is the
household-speciﬁc budget constraint whereas (6) and (7) are the household-
speciﬁc borrowing constraint and the no Ponzi condition. The borrowing
constraint can be motivated by limited enforcement where collateral guards
against default risks (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
Unmodelled credit market imperfections imply that the economy is pop-
ulated by two types of households, constrained and unconstrained,w h i c h
are of measure λ and 1-λ, respectively. The unconstrained households are
oﬀered an interest rate rL
t at which they can either lend or (safely) borrow.
The second type of household faces a binding borrowing constraint related
to their stock of housing wealth, (6), and they are charged an interest rate
rB
i,t >r L
t ,w h i c hr e ﬂects the fact that they are viewed as ‘riskier’ by the
lenders.16
16Nominal contracts, as in Iacoviello (2005), and housing depreciation, as in Calza,
Monacelli and Stracca (2007), are not central to our analysis and would complicate the
algebra without altering the message of this section.
28Denoting by βi the (possibly heterogenous) discount factor, the ﬁrst


















for the constrained borrowers, where χt represents the shadow value of the
borrowing constraint (6) at time t,a n dux refers to the incremental utility
from consuming an extra unit of x.Aﬁrst order condition such as (9) has
been derived by Zeldes (1989) for the case of unsecured lending, i.e. Bi,t ≥ 0
∀t.W eg e n e r a l i z eh e r eZ e l d e s ’m o d e lt o collateralized debt. To this end, we
also derive a housing demand:
uc,tQt − χtαE (Qt+1)+uh,t = βiE (uc,t+1Qt+1) (10)





and it can be interpreted as determining consumption given asset prices. In
what follows, we assume that uh,t is constant, as implied for instance by an
utility function of the form [C1−σ
i,t /(1-σ)+μHi,t]exp(τγi,t).17
To move towards an aggregate consumption equation, we take logs of
both sides of (11). For consistency with the empirical analysis of Section
3, where we have normalized individual borrowing rates by the Bank of
England policy rate, we rewrite the log-linearized version of (11) in terms of
the spread between borrowing and lending rates.18 After straightforward
17Alternatively, one could interpret Ht as housing services embodied in Ct.T h i si n t e r -
pretation, which corresponds to the case μ =0 , is consistent with a speculative motive
for owning a property but it implies the same reduced-form consumption equation used
in the main text and derived below.
18The formulation in terms of a spread measure is consistent with the idea that house-
holds can use ﬂexible mortgage borrowing arrangements to manage their inter-temporal
consumption decision rather than the Treasury Bill rate, which is more likely to be relevant
for saving. Obviously, this ignores the fact that unsecured credit (particularly credit card
borrowing) is also used for consumption smoothing. To extent that the factors driving
risk premia in mortgage lending are correlated with the determinants of risk premia in the
credit market as a whole, however, we would expect HEF also to measure some aspects
of access to all credit.
29algebra, we obtain an aggregate consumption equation which is isomorphic





lnβ + τ∆γt+1 + λ(1 + ¯ αi)∆qt+1+
+[1− λ(1 + ¯ αi)]rL









where a variable xt denotes ln(Xt), ∆ is the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator and
εt+1 is a combination of expectation and approximation errors.
Were no borrower constrained, ie λ =0 , equation (12) would reduce to
the standard Euler equation. In the special case of Hi,t =0 ,w eo b t a i n
a positive relationship between consumption growth and the shadow price
associated with the borrowing constraint (see Zeldes, 1989, and equation 9
in this appendix). The model implies that changes in house prices should
aﬀect consumption growth through a collateral eﬀect — higher house prices
increase the possibility of borrowing by constrained households.
It should be noted that all variables in (12) are averages over the relevant






is the average spread over the cohort of constrained borrowers (net of the
components attributable to individual characteristics), and it is therefore
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Figure 4: FES and ONS consumption growth, arithmetic averages
34Table 1: Aggregate FES consumption, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp
coeﬃcient
rt 0.312*** 0.187** 0.272*** 0.167**
(0.069) (0.087) (0.065) (0.074)
∆yt 0.401*** 0.332*** 0.232*** 0.188*
(0.108) (0.089) (0.080) (0.098)
∆aget -0.012 0.019 0.107 0.123*
(0.069) (0.062) (0.076) (0.069)
∆age2
t -0.004 -0.040 -0.140* -0.158**
(0.070) (0.065) (0.079) (0.073)
∆fsizet -1.011 -0.870 -2.875 -2.580
(2.990) (2.240) (2.277) (1.708)
∆fsize2
t 0.596 0.484 1.337 1.171
(1.448) (1.064) (1.112) (0.830)




obs 31 31 31 31
R2 0.51 0.61 0.64 0.71
Hetroskedasticity & serial correlation adjusted s.e. in parentheses; ***p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept not reported
35Table 2: Aggregate FES consumption, GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp
coeﬃcient
rt 0.326** 0.362*** 0.426*** 0.528***
(0.140) (0.114) (0.141) (0.117)
∆yt 0.424*** 0.338*** -0.034 0.048
(0.154) (0.129) (0.117) (0.113)
∆aget -0.035 -0.022 0.114*** 0.139***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.039) (0.021)
∆age2
t 0.020 0.002 -0.142*** -0.164***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.051) (0.024)
∆fsizet 0.173 -0.677 -1.964 -1.574
(2.622) (1.460) (1.760) (1.269)
∆fsize2
t -0.079 0.390 0.706 0.614
(1.243) (0.684) (0.836) (0.630)




obs 28 28 28 28
R2 0.465 0.611 0.558 0.757
Heteroskedasticity & serial correlation adjusted s.e. in parentheses; ***p<.01, **p<.05,
*p<.1; instrument list: second and third lags of consumption growth, disposable
income growth, RPIX inﬂation and 3m Treasury Bill rate, ﬁrst lag of HEF index
and house price inﬂation. Intercept not reported.
36Table 3: Aggregate FES consumption, GMM with ONS instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp
coeﬃcient
rt 0.350*** 0.395*** 0.490*** 0.536***
(0.116) (0.072) (0.156) (0.117)
∆yt 0.674*** 0.451*** 0.188 0.008
(0.119) (0.096) (0.133) (0.097)
∆aget -0.075 -0.033 0.084* 0.156***
(0.047) (0.042) (0.050) (0.028)
∆age2
t 0.073 0.020 -0.108* -0.183***
(0.050) (0.045) (0.055) (0.030)
∆fsizet 3.371 0.920 -1.375 -1.459
(3.220) (2.322) (1.477) (1.594)
∆fsize2
t -1.366 -0.296 0.546 0.521
(1.520) (1.076) (0.686) (0.762)




obs 28 28 28 28
R2 0.404 0.611 0.621 0.752
Hetroskedasticity & serial correlation adjusted s.e. in parentheses: ***p<.01, **p<.05,
*p<.1; Instrument list: ONS consumption growth and disposable income growth,
second and third lags of RPIX inﬂation and 3m Treasury Bill rate, ﬁrst lag of HEF index
and house price inﬂation. Intercept not reported.
37Table 4: Robustness - aggregate ONS consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp
coeﬃcient
rt -0.028 0.404 0.510** 0.976**
(0.457) (0.625) (0.239) (0.384)
∆yc,t 0.877*** 0.429 0.172 -0.108
(0.323) (0.518) (0.276) (0.273)
∆agec,t -0.075* -0.070** 0.044 0.058
(0.039) (0.035) (0.045) (0.043)
∆age2
c,t 0.094** 0.093** -0.042 -0.056
(0.041) (0.037) (0.050) (0.047)
∆fsizec,t 5.521 3.876 0.688 -1.379
(3.586) (3.873) (2.028) (2.004)
∆fsize2
c,t -2.821 -1.825 -0.325 0.816
(1.876) (2.101) (1.037) (1.049)




o b s 2 72 72 7 2 7
R2 0.424 0.407 0.620 0.584
Heteroskedasticity & serial correlation adjusted s.e. in parentheses; ***p<.01, **p<.05,
*p<.1; instrument list: second and third lags of consumption growth, disposable
income growth, RPIX inﬂation and 3m Treasury Bill rate, ﬁrst lag of HEF index
and house price inﬂation. Intercept not reported.
38Table 5: Robustness - aggregate FES non-durables consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp
coeﬃcient
rt 0.267*** 0.168** 0.232*** 0.150**
(0.062) (0.073) (0.047) (0.058)
∆yc,t 0.330*** 0.276*** 0.179** 0.145
(0.100) (0.089) (0.071) (0.085)
∆agec,t 0.010 0.034 0.117* 0.129**
(0.055) (0.053) (0.059) (0.057)
∆age2
c,t -0.023 -0.052 -0.145** -0.159**
(0.056) (0.057) (0.062) (0.060)
∆fsizec,t -0.824 -0.712 -2.495 -2.266
(2.473) (2.353) (1.993) (2.038)
∆fsize2
c,t 0.304 0.215 0.969 0.840
(1.182) (1.107) (0.937) (0.958)




obs 31 31 31 31
R2 0.56 0.63 0.68 0.73
Hetroskedasticity & serial correlation adjusted s.e. in parentheses; ***p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept not reported
39Table 6: Disaggregate consumption, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp interaction
coeﬃcient
rt 0.355*** 0.209*** 0.293*** 0.159** 0.178**
(0.030) (0.044) (0.027) (0.042) (0.055)
∆yc,t 0.475*** 0.454*** 0.422*** 0.408*** 0.409***
(0.053) (0.046) (0.064) (0.059) (0.061)
∆agec,t -0.064 -0.040 -0.019 0.004 -0.004
(0.062) (0.082) (0.054) (0.074) (0.076)
∆age2
c,t 0.007 -0.021 -0.036 -0.064 -0.057
(0.107) (0.112) (0.092) (0.097) (0.099)
∆fsizec,t 0.520 0.689 0.369 0.527 0.558
(0.468) (0.465) (0.600) (0.598) (0.621)
∆fsize2
c,t -0.328 -0.441* -0.310 -0.416 -0.418
(0.213) (0.196) (0.272) (0.258) (0.270)
HEF Indext -0.321** -0.289** -0.024
(0.105) (0.099) (0.057)












obs 159 156 159 156 156
R2 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.57
Clusters in birth cohort-adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***p<.01, **p<.05,
*p<.1; cohxx-yy is a dummy taking value one if the birth year is between xx and yy, and
zero otherwise; coeﬃcients on cohort dummy variables and cohort speciﬁct i m et r e n d s
not reported.
40Table 7: Disaggregate consumption, GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp interaction
coeﬃcient
rt 0.381*** 0.532** 0.635*** 0.824*** 0.845***
(0.146) (0.230) (0.169) (0.238) (0.240)
∆yc,t 0.504*** 0.394*** -0.068 -0.016 -0.057
(0.120) (0.131) (0.157) (0.128) (0.136)
∆agec,t 0.130 0.238* 0.323* 0.348** 0.353**
(0.135) (0.129) (0.178) (0.166) (0.162)
∆age2
c,t -0.201 -0.318** -0.383* -0.402** -0.394**
(0.150) (0.147) (0.205) (0.192) (0.185)
∆fsizec,t 0.577 0.743 0.087 0.175 0.376
(0.608) (0.649) (0.884) (0.883) (0.900)
∆fsize2
c,t -0.335 -0.476 -0.443 -0.454 -0.556
(0.309) (0.344) (0.414) (0.409) (0.426)
HEF Indext -0.200** -0.193** 0.006
(0.089) (0.092) (0.188)












obs 141 135 141 135 135
R2 0.50 0.53 0.37 0.43 0.44
Heteroskedasticity & serial correlation adjusted s.e. in parentheses;***p<.01,**p<.05,
*p<.1; cohxx-yy is a dummy taking value one if the birth year is between xx and yy, and
zero otherwise; coeﬃcients on cohort dummy variables and cohort speciﬁct i m et r e n d s

































42Table 8: Robustness - disaggregate consumption, GMM, ONS instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp interaction
coeﬃcient
rt 0.503*** 0.771*** 0.630*** 0.937*** 0.928***
(0.126) (0.192) (0.143) (0.213) (0.213)
∆yc,t 0.556*** 0.359*** 0.054 -0.049 -0.108
(0.108) (0.120) (0.122) (0.129) (0.137)
∆agec,t 0.066 0.183 0.287* 0.380** 0.409**
(0.124) (0.124) (0.153) (0.166) (0.166)
∆age2
c,t -0.125 -0.251* -0.344* -0.436** -0.467**
(0.136) (0.143) (0.180) (0.197) (0.197)
∆fsizec,t -0.060 0.091 -0.120 -0.347 -0.112
(0.572) (0.693) (0.828) (0.959) (0.993)
∆fsize2
c,t -0.015 -0.178 -0.269 -0.221 -0.375
(0.278) (0.347) (0.384) (0.438) (0.466)
HEF Indext -0.182** -0.135 0.080
(0.090) (0.095) (0.190)












obs 141 135 141 135 135
R2 0.49 0.52 0.43 0.41 0.40
Heteroskedasticity & serial correlation adjusted s.e. in parentheses;***p<.01,**p<.05,
*p<.1; cohxx-yy is a dummy taking value one if the birth year is between xx and yy, and
zero otherwise; coeﬃcients on cohort dummy variables and cohort speciﬁct i m et r e n d s
not reported; instrument list: see Table 3.
43Table 9: Robustness - disaggregate consumption by birth cohort and age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp interaction
coeﬃcient
rt 0.340*** 0.195*** 0.266*** 0.153** 0.164**
(0.028) (0.052) (0.035) (0.049) (0.061)
∆yc,t 0.465*** 0.449*** 0.418*** 0.412*** 0.411***
(0.058) (0.051) (0.055) (0.050) (0.054)
∆agec,t -0.006 0.011 0.041 0.048 0.052
(0.038) (0.041) (0.033) (0.039) (0.044)
∆age2
c,t -0.020 -0.042 -0.079** -0.088** -0.089**
(0.037) (0.035) (0.028) (0.033) (0.036)
∆fsizec,t 0.608 0.762 0.503 0.656 0.735
(0.443) (0.450) (0.522) (0.525) (0.593)
∆fsize2
c,t -0.396* -0.486** -0.395 -0.475* -0.510*
(0.205) (0.192) (0.237) (0.220) (0.265)
HEF Indext -0.300** -0.262** -0.039
(0.093) (0.091) (0.076)
















obs 165 165 165 165 165
R2 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.57
Clusters in birth cohort-adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***p<.01, **p<.05,
*p<.1; cohxx-yy is a dummy equal to one if the birth year is between xx and yy, and zero
otherwise; coeﬃcients on cohort dummy variables and cohort speciﬁct i m et r e n d sn o t
reported; young are people below 35.
44Table 10: Robustness - disaggregate non-durables consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
baseline HEF hp HEF & hp interaction
coeﬃcient
rt 0.350*** 0.247** 0.305*** 0.212** 0.221**
(0.052) (0.069) (0.057) (0.072) (0.074)
∆yc,t 0.441*** 0.420*** 0.403*** 0.389*** 0.389***
(0.043) (0.040) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046)
∆agec,t -0.130* -0.119* -0.097* -0.088 -0.101*
(0.051) (0.055) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046)
∆age2
c,t 0.101 0.086 0.070 0.057 0.068
(0.085) (0.081) (0.078) (0.073) (0.074)
∆fsizec,t 0.570 0.673 0.460 0.562 0.595
(0.479) (0.524) (0.560) (0.596) (0.634)
∆fsize2
c,t -0.364 -0.434 -0.350 -0.417 -0.423
(0.214) (0.238) (0.251) (0.268) (0.279)
HEF Indext -0.241** -0.220* -0.019
(0.092) (0.090) (0.054)












obs 159 156 159 156 156
R2 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.56
Clusters in birth cohort-adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***p<.01, **p<.05,
*p<.1; cohxx-yy is a dummy taking value one if the birth year is between xx and yy, and
zero otherwise; coeﬃcients on cohort dummy variables and cohort speciﬁct i m et r e n d s
not reported.
45Table 11: SML data - descriptive statistics
mean min max st dev
variable
spread 1.170 -2.088 13.375 1.338
loan 10.180 5.704 13.613 0.827
value 10.512 6.937 13.816 0.819
income 9.473 6.215 13.816 0.738
age 33.232 18 95 9.736
All variables, except spread and age, are in logarithms
Table 12: FES data - cohort deﬁnition and cell size
birth age in age in cell size cell size cell # years
cohort 1975 2005 minimum maximum mean
1 1940-44 31-35 61-65 141 702 573 31
2 1945-49 26-30 56-60 169 848 700 31
3 1950-54 21-25 51-55 156 715 626 31
4 1955-59 16-20 46-50 145 739 635 28
5 1960-64 11-15 41-45 168 817 686 23
6 1965-69 6-10 36-40 177 785 635 18
Table 13: FES data - descriptive statistics
mean min max st dev
variable
∆ci,t 1.64 -8.36 13.46 4.60
∆yi,t 2.27 -15.20 20.29 5.57
rt 3.03 -11.81 8.01 3.31
∆qt 3.17 -14.55 15.87 8.88
All variables are in log diﬀerences (except rt) times 100
46